Page 102 - IRMSA Risk Report 2020

THE C Y NEFIN TM SENSEM AKING FR AME W ORK : M AKING
SENSE OF THE W ORLD SO THAT WE C AN A C T IN IT

C OMPLEX C O M P L I C AT E D
PR OBE-SENSE -RESPOND S E N S E - A N A LY S E - R E S P O N D

ENABLING RESTR AINT S G O V E R N I N G R E S T R A I N T S

EMER GENT PR A C TICE G O O D P R A C T I C E

CHA O TIC OB VIOUS
A C T-SENSE -RESPOND SENSE-C ATEGORISE -RESPOND

NO A C TIVE C ONSTR AINT FIXED C ONSTR AINT S
NO VEL PR A C TICE BEST PR A C TICE

The Cynefin framework helps us define what kind of problem we are facing, what context we are in, and therefore what
TM
risk management methods and tools are applicable. Let’s look at the 5 main domains of the framework:
On the right-hand side of the framework we find two ordered domains: obvious and complicated order. In these ordered
domains the constraints imposed on the system create predictability and certainty. The boundary between the Obvious
and Complicated domains of Cynefin is a slightly artificial one as the difference between seeing something as obvious or
complicated often depends on the observers’ level of expertise. In the ordered domains of Cynefin we treat the world
TM
as certain and predictable. Here ordered approaches such as risk registers and implementing controls are valid and
useful. In these domains, because causal relationships are predictable, we are able to apply best practices or make use of
experts to do analysis.

However, once we move the left side of the framework, things change. Here we are dealing with unordered systems.
As with order, in unorder there are also two domains. In the complex domain, typically we are dealing with emergent
patterns, there are no repeating or linear causal relationships and we therefore need to interact with the system in order to
understand the dynamics at play. Here risk registers and controls will blind us to the real issues and potential surprises, i.e.
they often make things worse. In this domain we need to do sense-making, focus on asking questions not finding answers
and among other things increase the diversity of perspectives we pay attention to. One way of doing this is by deploying
human sensor networks and new forms of research like the distributed ethnography applied in the study undertaken in
this IRMSA Risk Report.

The chaotic domain, the second unordered domain, differs from the others in the sense that it is transitory. Here there are
no effective constraints, i.e. things are random. A system tends to collapse into chaos when an unforeseen crisis or event
occurs. This state cannot be maintained for very long as constraints either emerge or are imposed. Chaos is a domain of
crisis, but also innovation. Here Churchill’s truism is valid: Never waste a good crisis.
Something risk managers in particular need to pay attention to is the fold at the bottom of the boundary between the
obvious and chaotic domains. This boundary is drawn like that because it represents a “cliff”. Systems very often collapse
into chaos when they become complacent while the context around them is changing, or too many inappropriate rigid
constraints are imposed it. For example, if we manage to the lowest common denominator, we often impose so many
safety rules or financial governance constraints that it becomes almost impossible for people to get work done without

breaking rules. Over time this creates a culture of rule-breaking that can lead to dire consequences and ultimately a
collapse into chaos.
The final domain is the central domain of disorder. This is a state of confusion or not having sufficient information to make
sense of the situation and determine which domain the system or problem is in.
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