Page 58 - IRMSA Risk Report 2020
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4.3.9
        INSUFFICIENT  ELEC TRICIT Y  AND / OR  ENER GY

            DUE TO INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, CORRUPTION, HISTORICAL MAINTENANCE/REFURBISHMENT BACKLOGS A
         CONSTRAINED SYSTEM, DELAYS IN KEY POLICY DECISIONS AND AN ENORMOUS DEBT BURDEN, ESKOM’S ABILITY TO
         PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ELECTRICITY MAY DETERIORATE FURTHER WITH NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
                                                AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE.

               SCENARIOS                    FLAGS                    RISK RANKING OVER LAST 5 YEARS

                                      Leadership                                   RANKING SCALE
                                      Institutional capacity           10  9   8   7   6   5  4   3   2   1
                                      Politics
                SPRING OF HOPE
                                      Social cohesion
                                      National policy
           FAKE IT TILL WE MAKE IT...OR NOT?  Service delivery                     ANNUAL RANKING
                                      Inequality                    2015    2016   2017    2018   2019    2020
                                                                                    NOT
                                                                                            NOT
                                      Economy                                      RANKED  RANKED
               PERPETUAL HANGOVER
                                      Global trends
                                      Climate
           This risk has been present for a number of years and, despite improvements in 2016 and 2017, has further deteriorated
            in 2018 and 2019. Eskom is in a dire financial position and is struggling with deep-rooted operational and governance
          problems. It seems as if the utility has reached a point of no return, where historical structures and solutions may no longer
         be suitable to ensure the country’s electricity supply going forward. This is underpinned by the climate crisis, an accelerating
           global energy transition, strong and divergent stakeholder interests, as well as the need for a Just Energy Transition that
                                              matches the South African context.

               TOP 5 CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING                      TOP 5 RISK TREATMENT OPTIONS AND
                             TARGETS                                          OPPORTUNITIES
         1.  Deteriorating plant performance, due to inadequate   1.  Prioritisation of maintenance and the space needed in a
             investment in maintenance & mid-life refurbishment.  constrained system to increase the reliability of plants.
         2.  Poor performance of Medupi and Kusile due to design   2.  Clear direction on industry structure and market rules to
             problems as well as delays in commissioning.        encourage investment.
         3.  Funding and capacity constraints impacting the ability to   3.  Integrated planning and frequent iterations to deal with
             undertake plant maintenance.                        uncertainty and change.
         4.  Decision-making processes and long lead times for the   4.  Energy efficiency to reduce demand and energy diversity to
             development of new infrastructure.                  increase supply.
         5.  Lack of effective leadership and long-term strategic thinking in   5.  Electricity generation or storage by private individuals,
             a highly complex sector.                            where possible, to reduce pressure and reliance on the grid.

                                                 FAC TS AND FIGURES
                                    INDIC ATOR            2007/08      2018/19     CHANGE
                         Installed capacity (MW)           42 618       45 561        7%
                         Electricity sales (GWh)           218 120      212 190      2.7%
                         Revenue (Rbn)                      39.4         177.4       350%
                         Average selling price (c/kWh)       18          85.06       373%
                         Coal purchases (Mt)                117.4       115.49       1.6%
                         Coal costs (Rbn)                    10          53.8        438%
                         Employee costs (Rbn)                9.5         29.5        210%
                         Number of employees               32 674       48 628       49%
                         Debt securities and borrowings (Rbn)  40.5      388.7       860%
         •  Eskom’s net loss of R21bn (R2.3bn in the prior year) during 2018/19 is attributed to municipal debt of R20bn;
         •  Eskom’s revenue increased from R39.4bn in 2007/08 to R180bn in 2018/19 but was diminished by the increase in input costs;
         •  Over the past decade, debt has increased by 986.42% from R40.5bn in 2007/08 to R440bn in 2018/19, with debt servicing cost
            amounting to R85bn per year;
         •  During 2017/18, Eskom had a workforce of 48 628. A decade previously the workforce was 13 000. Political and trade union pressure
            prevents the retrenchment of workers to reduce costs;
         •  Eskom’s wage bill for 2018/19 is estimated at R27.14bn (R5.14bn in 1998) following a 7.5% wage increase in 2018;
         •  The widening gap between electricity demand and sales is symptomatic of a “utility death spiral” where new technology makes self-
            generation increasingly price-competitive, which leads to continuously declined sales and increased tariffs, in a never-ending spiral; and
         •  NERSA approved a 13.87% average price increase w.e.f. 1 April 2019 for Eskom direct customers and a 15.63% average price increase for
            municipalities w.e.f. 1 July 2019. Additional increases of 8.1% for 2020 and 5.2% for 2021 were also announced. These figures are well
            below Eskom’s targeted increases of 17.1%, 15.4% and 15.5% for the next three years respectively.
         Sources: Eskom on its 2018/19 Annual Report, www.pmg.org.za/committee-meeting; Eskom group annual results, for the year ended 31 March 2019, p. 12.; Eskom
         on its 2018/19 Annual Report, www.pmg.org.za/committee-meeting; Department of Public Enterprises, Context of SONA 2019: The Eskom challenges, Centre for
         Risk Analysis, SANEA
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