Page 59 - IRMSA Risk Report 2020
P. 59

EXPERT OPINION
                                                   EXPERT
                                                             OPINION

       ROBERT KOCH
       SENIOR MANAGER: ENTERPRISE RESILIENCE, ESKOM

       The risk has deteriorated, considering Eskom’s financial position and coal fleet performance (energy
       availability  in  Dec  2019  reached  historical  lows). Whilst  the  Integrated  Resource  Plan  (IRP)  was
       approved in 2019, implementation is slow. Measures are being implemented to address corruption.

       A factor not generally considered in debating this risk is the complex inter-relatedness between
       decisions that affect the sector. The consequences of sometimes well-intended interventions are
       often not adequately anticipated and addressed.

       The key impediments that prevent SA from effectively dealing effectively with this risk are:
       •   System constraints, requiring the risk of load shedding if maintenance is to be undertaken.
       •  Governance, policy delays, lack of Board independence, inefficient industry structures, and
          corruption.
       •  Lack of stakeholder alignment due to vested interests (government, coal, nuclear & renewable
          industries, unions, business, local communities)
       The key indicators (flags) that are indicative of how this risk may play out in future are:
       •  Leadership: the tone set by the new Eskom CEO/Board.
       •  Support for an integrated recovery plan that addresses (i) the maintenance/refurbishment backlog and performance of Medupi and Kusile, (ii)
          immediate capacity solutions that balance cost and risk-taking related to load shedding, (iii) execution of the IRP.
       •  Support for a financial recovery plan that addresses Eskom debt, revenue, and non-payment.
       •  Support for approach to addressing structural inefficiencies.

       Key interventions for effective risk responses are:
       •  Maintenance: prioritising generation recovery over short-term goals, such as avoiding load shedding “at all costs”.
       •  Capacity: short-term power procurement and expediting grid access for distributed generation and battery storage.
       •  Accountability: Setting up the conditions for accountability.
       •  Skills: addressing the loss and attraction of critical skills.
       •  Governance: Addressing inefficiencies at all levels.
       •  Vision: Fostering a collective mind-set that positions the sector for the future, rather than a “return to the past”.





      PAUL NEL
      ENERGY LEAD: AFRIC A, AURECON
      The electricity crisis is still getting worse and will only improve once the finances and performance
      have been turned around.

      Facts that are not considered are the risks that have been neither fully understood nor widely shared
      yet. These include the impact on labour and the concept of a “Just Transition” – specifically how this
      relates to the timelines proposed for the unbundling and decommissioning of Eskom and/or parts of
      Eskom. The key impediments that prevent SA from effectively dealing with this risk are:
      •   Lack of skilled personnel who understand the complexity of thermal power generation;
      •   Various stakeholders’ vested interest in coal mining; and
      •   The high rate of unemployment and the perception that this will increase with the closure of
          thermal power stations and associated mines.
      •   The key indicators (flags) that are indicative of how this risk may play out in future are:
      •   The release of the Round 5 procurement programme for private renewable energy projects;
      •   The meeting of timelines proposed in the Turnaround Plan – specifically the rate at which
          Eskom is to be unbundled;
      •   The timeframe for the stabilisation of Eskom’s technical performance; and
      •   A turnaround of finances.
      Key interventions for effective risk responses are:
      •   Ensuring the Turnaround Plan and IRP are implemented as comprehensively as possible; and
      •   Recognising the opportunities: the ability to create an open energy market and ultimately allow for lower energy prices.
      The alternative to tariff increases is a bailout from Government, but the Government already guarantees R350 bn of Eskom’s R440bn debt. National
      Treasury expected national debt to reach R3tn in 2019, increasing to R4.5tn over the next three years, so there is little room for additional borrowing.
      Bold policy reform is needed, such as reducing Eskom’s wage bill, selling assets, and appointing staff on merit. Government could also consider allowing
      profit-seeking private competitors to enter the market. Until these core problems are addressed energy constraints will continue to head off any prospect
      of SA maintaining emerging market growth norms.


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